Bolshevik Surveillance 419 specificity is often asserted but seldom demonstrated. One gets a very different view by examining how some Soviet practices elaborated on actions of the tsarist regime (particularly in its total war manifestation) and paralleled similar measures by contemporaneous anti-Soviet movements.
What is surveillance? As used here, surveillance refers to information gathering and handling of a particular type: that which observes the population's attitudes, in aggregate, for political purposes (politics being understood as the endeavor intended par excellence to transform the world). That is, surveillance is the collection of information for the purpose not of reporting the population's collective mood but of managing and shaping it." As such, surveillance must be seen as part and parcel of a larger shift in the goal of ruling, a shift from a territorial concept to a governmental one. A governmental state seeks to manage populations, not just to rule territories.'2 Of course, the people who made up "the population" had always existed, but they had not always been conceptualized as a discrete, aggregate object. A governmental state seeks to manage its population not so much legitimately or righteously as effectively and economically. Once the Russian political elite began to conceptualize the body politic in terms of a "population" (instead of, say, a divinely established order of estates), its duty became serving the aspirations and needs of this new focus of legitimacy.'3 In the process of investigating these needs through varied mechanisms (censuses, agricultural studies, statistics), the political elite summoned "the population" (as a discrete entity) into being. '4 In Russia, the Revolution brought into sharp focus this shift from an administrative, territorial state to a governmental one. Nicholas II had been emperor of "all the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc." He ruled territorial entities rather than a collectivity of citizens. After 1917 all political movements (the Provisional Government, the Constituent Assembly, the Soviet Council of People's Commissars, and nearly all anti-Soviet movements in the Civil War) claimed to represent not a territory, but the people living within it. And to engage the population most productively, states required a new discipline of popular attitudes: surveillance.
It is important to note that the concept of surveillance is not something thought up, after the fact, by historians. Contemporaries, by the terms they used, distinguished policing (reporting on delinquents, malcontents, and even revolutionaries as individuals in order to protect an established order) from surveillance (reporting on the whole population to amass aggregate rather than individual data on attitudes in order better to act upon society).'5 Policing was concerned with maintaining public order: its goal was to protect people from exposure to contaminants, be they heresies, books, or ideas.'6 While it contin- 15 Policing involved oversight (nadzor) as carried out by the Security Agency (Okhrana), whose very title denotes the negative goal of safeguarding an extant society from threats. Russians employed a different term for the surveillance endeavor, which was identified as information collection and dissemination (osvedomlenie, a term invariably implying a two-way circuit of information), through organs explicitly termed "political" (as in the "secret political departments" of the "Unified State Political Administration" [OGPU]). A similar distinction existed in the intelligence and military fields between "intelligence departments" (razvedyvatel'noe otdelenie), which gathered traditional military and diplomatic intelligence (razvedka), and the "political sections" (politotdel), which practiced political surveillance. Two separate agencies existed because each was seeking different kinds of information. 16 For an excellent treatment of the police organs in the earlier Nicholaevan period, see Sidney Monas, The Third Section (Cambridge, 1961), which is attentive both to the more general European context and to the specific meaning of police in cameralist and Rechtsstaat thought (see pp. 22-23, 294 on the difference between nineteenth-and twentieth-century meanings of "police" The state went about collecting the knowledge it required to meet this newly conceived task through two primary mechanisms. First, it constructed surveillance bureaucracies to conduct regularized reporting on the population's attitudes. And second, the state engaged in the routine perlustration of correspondence (perlustration being the interception and reading of mail for the express purpose of discovering what people were writing and thinking-in contrast to censorship, which has as its goal the control of content). The creation of organs for the express purpose of quantifying and analyzing the population's attitudes (be they progovernment, antigovernment, or indifferent) was a qualitatively new endeavor. Indeed, categories such as "popular support" and especially "apathy" simply were not part of the mental universe of tsarist bureaucrats (at least until early in the twentieth century). Subjects were either obedient or not. The administrative goal was compliance rather than belief. In sharp contrast to this, Soviet officials expressed a burning interest not so much in people's behavior as in what they thought and believed.'8 Surveillance is important, then, not so much because it generated all sorts of material on public opinion or national morale, but because it demonstrates the state's emerging concern for this sphere. Thus we must examine not only the materials themselves but also the project that first required and then generated them. Studying surveillance is not being trendy or anachronistic. Surveillance was the pursuit for which contemporaries were busy devising new terms and building new bureaucracies.
I. SURVEILLANCE IN 1913 AND IN 1920
To demonstrate the explosive emergence of surveillance as a practice of governing, one can simply compare how it was practiced at two points in time, 18 Kenez (n. 7 above), pp. 10-11, insightfully compares the Bolshevik agenda to that of the Catholic church. 422 Holquist first under the Imperial and then under the Soviet regime. In 1913 the tsarist regime most definitely engaged in perlustration, practiced in so-called Black Offices.'9 However, the autocracy limited the opening and perusing of mail to the correspondence of suspected revolutionaries and opponents of the regime (plus, of course, diplomatic correspondence). That is, the autocracy practiced perlustration for purposes of policing and intelligence. The number of surveillance technocrats serving in such Black Offices throughout the entire Empire came to a grand total of forty-nine people.
Seven years later, in 1920, we find a very different type of surveillance being practiced. The Soviet regime was intercepting and reading not just the letters of individual suspects but nearly all correspondence passing through the post. The goal of this massive effort was not simply to destroy those letters reflecting poorly on the regime or even to identify dissidents: it was in addition to compile "summary reports" complete with extensive excerpts from representative letters. To this end, the Soviet regime, in the midst of a civil war contesting its very existence, was employing somewhere in the neighborhood of ten thousand officials-ten thousand trusted and trained officials-for opening and analyzing citizens' mail. And when the Civil War ended in 1921, responsibility for perlustration passed from military postal boards to Cheka and OGPU information departments. Throughout the 1920s the regime continued to scrutinize letters passing through the mail, making ever more extensive extracts and ever more detailed summaries. The Soviet regime's desire for information was so voracious and all-encompassing that it came to establish "information networks" (osvedomitel'naia set') to keep track of shifting moods even among inhabitants of the GULAG and POW camps. The extent of these networks is truly stunning. According to one report, by 1944 the information network in the GULAG camp system came to encompass nearly 8 percent of the total detained population. According to another report, every third German being held in the postwar POW camps contributed at some point to the information network.23 In this case, "information" was obviously not needed to identify potential enemies (these populations had already been deemed hostile) or even to forestall their actions (they were already under detention). These figures testify instead to the regime's intense desire to have all-encompassing (one is tempted to say total) information on "political moods"-not in order to control people or to protect itself, but to put it to use in refashioning even these detained-but still redeemable-people.
Moreover, the regime valued equally information about those determined to be incorrigible. The Soviets massacred the Polish detainees at Katyn in 1940, but they retained the judicial proceedings and other material on these people until 1959. Likewise, when the Soviets retreated before the German Army in 1941, they deliberately removed many files on the people they were holding. Many of the prisoners whom the files documented they simply shot.24 One cannot escape the conclusion that the information about these people was more important to the regime than the people themselves. And here again this information had no prophylactic use whatsoever, as the people who were documented were already dead. For the Soviet state, then, surveillance and information-gathering cannot have been primarily a defensive endeavor.
In any 28 Zemstvos were the self-governing units that were established by the Great Reforms in the 1860s and that employed the fabled "Third Element." They presented themselves as society's antipode to the autocratic state. mental surveillance. The autocracy moved from concern only about court opinion and the revolutionary movement and increasingly sought to probe the "mood" of zemstvo and industrial circles through a network of secret reporting. Yet the tsarist state held no monopoly on such aspirations. Zemstvos in the Ufa region, for instance, took up a project on the eve of the war to establish an entire network of "reading huts" (izba-chital' nia) at the village level-all, of course, in order to transform benighted peasants into enlightened citizens.29
So prior to 1914 Russian officials had certainly conceived of surveillance as a project, and they had even taken some tentative steps to realize their aspirations. However, it was during the First World War that these embryonic plans for social management were massively translated into practice. Thirteen months into a war that was rapidly becoming total, the Imperial administration reevaluated its conduct of the war and came to the conclusion that it could no longer rely only on commands but must instead seek to harness the country's "vital forces. 430 Holquist thousands of perused letters, officials in every army formation and each military district throughout the Russian Empire compiled "summaries" (using mimeographed forms) and categorized (in statistical percentages) all correspondence as "patriotic," "depressed," and "indifferent." One such summary from 1916, with comic precision, recorded 30.25 percent of all letters "patriotic," 2.15 percent "depressed," and 67.6 percent "indifferent."37 And, like their associates in Britain, authorities in Russia sought not only to record but also to shape soldier-correspondents' means of self-expression-and indeed their identities-through standardized form letters and postcards.38 Soldiers were aware that the authorities had a newfound interest in their letters. Many refrained from using the military postal system and tried to use only the civil post instead.39 One soldier tried another tack and appealed to the censor directly, by appending a PS to his letter: "Dear Sir, Mr. Censor: let this letter through, because you yourself know that we are being slaughtered like cattle to no purpose."40 Thus surveillance involved not only collecting material but also had begun to shape how people thought they could express themselves-while at the same time suggesting to them that their views mattered.
Tellingly, postal censorship departments were not abolished with the February 1917 Revolution but continued their activity throughout 1917 under the Provisional Government. They were abolished only with the Soviet Revolution in October 1917. Yet the Soviets found they could not do without the information generated by postal censorship organs, and in 1918 they reintroduced these organs in the Red Army. This is not to say that there were not important differences. The Soviet regime, with its larger definition of the political sphere, was concerned with a much broader spectrum of issues than the tsarist regime had been. But the task and structure of the Soviet organs did not fundamentally 37 Ibid., p. 545; see also Sidorov, ed., pp. 296-97, 309. The Kostroma zemstvo likewise sought to quantify the village's mood in statistical categories: the compilers reported that 44 percent of the responses indicated a mood they characterized as "depressed" or as involving a view of the war as a calamity; 39 percent were classified "inspired" or "confident"; and 17 percent were considered "indifferent" or "apathetic" (Voina i Kostromskaia derevnia, pp. 66-77). differ from that of their prerevolutionary predecessors. Again, the purpose was less to forestall unrest than to measure opinion so as to act on it. Soviet military censors copied out excerpts from all letters indicating in any way-positive, negative, or apathetic-the author's political attitudes. These excerpts were then codified and served as the source for regular bimonthly thematic and regional reports. There were desertion summaries, supply summaries, summaries on abuse of office-but the most prevalent was the political summary.4' It is not difficult to demonstrate the Soviet concern for surveillance. It became suffused throughout virtually the entire Soviet apparatus. In the course of the Civil War, every major Soviet institution-the army, the Party, the Soviet civil apparatus, the Cheka-generated "summaries on the population's mood" (svodki o nastroenii naseleniia). The Cheka not only demanded regular summaries; it also circulated critiques of incomplete or unsatisfactory reports, indicating the specific error and what was expected in the future. In particular, the Cheka sternly admonished its officials that it was not enough merely to describe attitudes; they should also "indicate what explains" these attitudes.42 Similarly, the postal censorship departments not only issued "summaries" but also invariably included interpretative analyses of their contents in an accompanying cover letter. Here one is confronted with a major surprise, however. Recalling Stalin's explicit claim that the Bolsheviks aspired to be engineers of the human soul, scholars are prepared for the fact that the Soviet regime would seek knowledge of people's inner lives. Yet how is one to explain entire caches of reports on the populace's moods generated by surveillance bureaucracies of the antiSoviet movements?47
It could be argued that the Whites merely sought to counter Soviet surveillance activities. Certainly this was a consideration. But White movements embarked on surveillance projects of their own even before the Soviets got their apparatus up and running. In the Don territory, for instance, even localized anti-Soviet insurgencies felt it necessary to form their own surveillance organs.48 And the Whites evinced an identical concern for knowing about and fostering the population's consciousness (not "public opinion" or "popular support"). This was the goal, after all: one couldn't act on people's consciousness (however that consciousness might be defined) unless one had first determined at what level it already stood. All political movements had passed through the experience of the First World War and all had emerged from it thinking of surveillance as indispensible to governing. For while the various movements in the Civil War all appealed to different constituencies and sought to realize different views of the world, they all operated within the governmental paradigm. That is, they all practiced a form of politics predicated on the social theory of representation and deriving legitimacy from the idea of popular sovereignty. And while they differed significantly over the precise form the world should take, they all viewed politics as a tool for both sculpting society and operating on populations to realize this blueprint.49
For the anti-Soviet movements surveillance was just as routinized and wellestablished as it was for the Bolsheviks. Among the very first acts of the antiSoviet Don government was to establish a "Don Information Agency" (what I shall only half-facetiously term the DIA). In informing the population about the new agency, the authorities described its task as twofold. First, it was to inform the population "about the military and political situation and also about the government's activity"; and second, it was to inform the government about "life, events and sentiments in the territory."50 This agency came to encompass a network of roughly two hundred subcenters, sixty centers, and nine district departments, in addition to the central administration.5' The DIA's network for But information was equally meant to flow in the other direction, informing the government of the population's "mood." For this task, the DIA established an entire network of secret informers and set up special courses to train them. These agents then traveled undercover throughout the Don territory in the guise of actors, refugees, students, railway workers, teachers, and even obstetricians. It was from the regular reports of these agents and employees working in its subcenters that the central administration compiled its own daily summaries.56 These summaries were organized topically, with each topic assigned a letter. It is no coincidence that the first letter of the alphabet was reserved for reports "on the population's mood."
Nor did the Whites share only the practice of surveillance. White surveillance technocrats also shared a concern about people's "consciousness" (a condition that officials in the late tsarist period had increasingly also sought to foster). Thus the project of transforming ignorant subjects into emancipated and enlightened citizens derived not from socialism alone, but also from a much larger tectonic shift in the nature of politics (from territorial to governmental), of which socialism was merely the most successful and forceful representative.
The White surveillance project, like its Red counterpart, was concerned at least as much with thought as with action. German Stimmung), the French Army established its own postal censorship boards "for the express purpose of reading and analyzing the mail that passed through their hands."66 And from mid-1917 the French Army General Staff's central intelligence section took to compiling regular "confidential bulletins on internal morale," drawing primarily on materials generated by postal censorship boards at the front and throughout the country.67
The British Army also resorted to this measure, albeit later than the other major powers (this delay being due less to some innate liberalism than to the fact that universal conscription was introduced only in the course of the war; morale, both at home and in the ranks, becomes a far greater concern for a citizen army). Throughout Europe, as Michael Geyer has noted, the "encompassing and comprehensive mobilization of the nation for war was a common feature of all the major belligerents in World War One.... All the nations resorted to a tangled web of compulsion and suasion, developed national forms of management."89 The First World War was the matrix within which states nurtured their own particular aspirations and developed the mechanisms to realize them. And Geyer's observations on Europe in general apply fully to Russia. In Russia's case, however, the 1917 Revolution has obstructed our view of the changes that took place in the course of the war. Indeed, if the Russian Civil War is seen as an extension of Europe's general 1914-18 deluge, the Russian Revolution, far from ending the war in 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, might instead be seen as having extended Russia's own deluge experience until 1921, three years longer than for the rest of Europe. That extension is significant because it provided a rationale for the continued existence of a wartime national security (total war) regime that carried Russia through the Revolution: Russia now had a different ex post facto explanation for the changes it had undergone along with other European societies. That is, the 1917 Revolution suggested that Russia's national security style of state modernization-a style of modernization common to many other European powers-originated not in the shared experience of the Great War but in the unique experience of Russia's Revolution. In discussing the changed world, Europe and Russia now had different short answers to describe the deluges they had undergone. Europe ascribed the changed world to the Great War; Russia, to its Revolution.
What then of ideology? Was Bolshevik Russia like every other European state in the post-1918 period? Clearly it was not. And the difference between Russia's and Europe's political and institutional development was not just a matter of the rhetorical explanation attached to some generic form of modernization. Russia's institutionalization of modernity, in its statist form, was conceptually telescoped into the Revolution-and the Revolution (in its Bolshevik configuration, of course) then came to shape the conceptual ends to which these practices were directed. Instead of operating on nation-states (both its own and others) and seeking national security, the Soviet Union employed these common tools on classes (outside but especially within its own borders) in an attempt to bring about socialism.90 "The Revolution" simultaneously be-
